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Foreword 
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the  
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) established the Air Force Center for Systems 
Engineering (AF CSE) at its Wright Patterson AFB campus in 2003. With academic oversight by 
a subcommittee on systems engineering, chaired by then-Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis, 
the AF CSE was tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept definition, 
acquisition, and sustainment. The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning 
objectives, and suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis. 
The Department of Defense is exponentially increasing the acquisition of joint complex 
systems that deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter. Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining 
robust, high-quality, affordable solutions. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the 
need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. Gaining an 
understanding of the past and distilling learning principles that are then shared with others 
through our formal education and practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous 
improvement. 
The AF CSE has published eleven case studies thus far including the A-10, KC-135 
Simulator, Global Hawk, C-5A, F-111, Hubble Telescope, Theater Battle Management Core 
System, International Space Station, Global Positioning System (GPS), the HH/MH-53, and the 
E-10A. All case studies are available on the AF CSE website, http://www.afit.edu/cse. These 
cases support academic instruction on SE within military service academies, civilian and military 
graduate schools, industry continuing education programs, and those practicing SE in the field. 
Each of the case studies is comprised of elements of success as well as examples of SE decisions 
that, in hindsight, were not optimal. Both types of examples are useful for learning. 
Along with discovering historical facts, we have conducted key interviews with program 
managers and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various 
prime and subcontractors. From this information, we have concluded that the discipline needed 
to implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to 
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions. We look forward to your comments 
on this case study and our other AF CSE published studies. 
 
Thomas F Christian, SES, DAF 
Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government. 
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1 Systems Engineering Principles 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these 
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process focused explicitly on 
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of 
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that 
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with 
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the 
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost 
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses 
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the 
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the 
conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has a long history. Examples can be found 
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as 
well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes. Throughout the many decades during which 
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools 
have been developed, documented, and applied.  
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging during 
any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements. Second, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the 
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And third, 
the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities in all 
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system 
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to 
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying 
the requirements or set of requirements.  
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs. 
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas.  
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is 
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex system of systems. Once a 
solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to 
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ensure satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), 
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes 
place well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented in 
the literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of 
the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides, 
and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering Electronic Industries 
Association, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and various Department of 
Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They show the process as it should be applied by 
today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1-1. It should be noted that this model is not 
accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the lowest level 
of definition of the design and its interfaces.  
 
Figure 1-1 The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by DAU 
1.2 DoD Directive 5000 Series 
During President Richard Nixon’s first term, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird faced 
congressional attempts to lower defense spending. The cause was the Vietnam War and the 
rising cost of defense acquisition, as well as emerging energy and environmental programs. Laird 
and David Packard, his deputy, recognized the need for a mechanism to control and manage 
spending especially with the coming fiscal constraint. In May 1969, Packard formed the Defense 
Systems Acquisition Review Council to give advice on the acquisition of major weapon systems. 
It was chartered to review major milestones as well as conduct occasional management reviews. 
One year later in 1970, Packard issued a policy memorandum that was to become the foundation 
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for the DoD 5000 series of documents which were first issued in 1971, and as of January 2008 
have been reissued 10 times. The original purpose of the DoD 5000 series was to improve the 
management of acquisition programs and include policy to streamline management, decentralize 
execution, and use appropriate management structures. The 1971 issue of the DoD 5000 series 
established the following program considerations (abbreviated here) pertaining to progression of 
a program through the acquisition process. 
1. System need shall be clearly established in operational terms, with appropriate limits, and 
shall be challenged throughout the acquisition process … Wherever feasible, operational 
needs shall be satisfied through the use of existing military or commercial hardware … 
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of acquisition and ownership 
… Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost and schedule … 
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principle design parameter … 
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to assure that the demonstration of 
actual achievement is the pacing function … Schedules and funding profiles shall be 
structured to accommodate unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without 
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency. 
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed … Models, mock-ups, and system 
hardware will be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level. 
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A determination of operational 
suitability, including logistics support requirements, will be made prior to large scale 
production commitments …  
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including risk …  
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor’s capability to 
develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis …  
9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide information which 
is essential to effective management control … Documentation shall be generated in the 
minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management needs. 
1.3 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop the aircraft 
and systems of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the 
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. Notwithstanding, the cost 
and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed 
programs and ones with less-than-stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 1990s, 
large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule. Aerospace 
industry primes were becoming larger and more geographically and culturally distributed and 
worked diligently to establish common systems engineering practices across their enterprises. 
However, these common practices must be understood and be useful both within the enterprise 
and across multiple corporations and vendor companies because of the mega-trend of teaming in 
large (and some small) programs. It is essential that the systems engineering process effect 
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integration, balance, allocation, and verification and be useful to the entire program team down 
to the design and interface level. 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS) 
context, network-centric warfare and operations, an increased attention to human systems 
integration, and the rapid growth in information technology. These factors are driving a more 
sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and capable features, along with 
new tools and procedures. One area of increased focus of the systems engineering process is the 
informational systems architectural definitions used during system analysis. This process, 
described in the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF), emphasizes greater reliance on 
reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented characteristics.  
1.4 Case Studies 
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system and system-of-
systems projects is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past. 
Examination of systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can 
provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process. It was this 
thinking that led to the initiation of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case study 
effort, as well as the present continuation of that effort. 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles. They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The 
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple 
professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied 
functional data will be emphasized. When they are taken together, the student is provided real-
world, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule, and 
performance.  
The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles will be highlighted, with 
special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering practices. 
Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management 
and learning principles, to include whether: 
• every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer; 
• effective requirements analysis was applied; 
• consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards was 
applied; 
• effective test planning was accomplished; 
• there were effective major technical program reviews; 
• continuous risk assessments and management was implemented; 
• there were reliable cost estimates and policies; 
• they used disciplined application of configuration management; 
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• a well-defined system boundary was defined; 
• they used disciplined methodologies for complex systems ; 
• human systems integration was accomplished; 
• problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the larger operational 
environment. 
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or system-of-
systems. Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into detailed design 
requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to the 
development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and balance the 
requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its life 
cycle. Systems engineering case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to 
achieve this balance, which include: 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface between the operational user and 
developer (acquirer) essential to translate the needs into the performance requirements for 
the system and subsystems. 
• The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering to 
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
• The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as 
both internal and external. This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the 
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new 
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and government 
staffing levels. 
1.5 Framework for Analysis 
The Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case studies will present learning principles 
specific to each program, but will utilize the Friedman-Sage framework to organize the 
assessment of the application of the systems engineering process. The Systems Engineering case 
studies published by the Air Force Institute of Technology employed the Friedman-Sage 
construct and matrix as the baseline assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems 
engineering process for the topic program.  
The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role in developing case studies 
in systems engineering and systems management, especially case studies that involve systems 
acquisition. The Friedman-Sage framework is a nine row by three column matrix shown in  
Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1 A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor Responsibility 
2. Shared 
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and 
Management    
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design    
C. System and Subsystem 
Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface 
Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post 
Deployment    
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management    
I. System and Program 
Management    
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1 represent phases in the Systems Engineering 
lifecycle: 
A. Requirements definition and management; 
B. Systems architecting and conceptual design; 
C. System and subsystem detailed design and implementation; 
D. Systems and interface integration; 
E. Verification and validation; 
F. Deployment and post deployment. 
Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management 
support: 
G. Life cycle support; 
H. Risk assessment and management; 
I. System and program management. 
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While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman–Sage framework suggests 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the 
process. Most other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix 
appear to be subsets of one of these. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework 
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared 
responsibilities between the government and the contractor. In teaching systems engineering in 
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and responsibilities of the 
government and industry activities. While the government has responsibility in all nine concept 
domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements. 
 
Figure 1-2 Artist’s concept of the LAIRCM 
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2 Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System Description 
2.1 LAIRCM System Description 
The LAIRCM system autonomously detects and declares Infrared (IR) threat missiles, tracks 
the missiles and jams the missiles to create a miss, resulting in aircrew and aircraft protection. 
The system has no interoperability requirements outside the platform on which it is installed. The 
LAIRCM system consists of five basic subsystem components, all related technical orders (TOs), 
support equipment, training systems, related facilities, materiel, software, services, and personnel 
required to ensure the system can perform its intended operational function. The specific quantity 
of LAIRCM system components is platform dependent; the platform will also determine if they 
will use the Phase I or Phase II components as follows: 
1. System Processor (SP) 
2. Control Indicator Unit (CIU) 
3. Missile Warning Sensor (MWS) 
subsystem 
4. Laser Transmitter Assembly 
(LTA) subsystem  
5. ViperTM Multi-band Laser 
subsystem (VL) 
As shown in Figure 2-2, the LAIRCM 
system has three small laser transmitter 
assemblies (SLTAs), which are mounted 
on the aircraft, as well as five missile 
warning transmitters at various points on the aircraft. The three LTAs are mounted with two in 
the front and one under the tail. A processor located on the flight deck of the aircraft collects the 
data and transmits information to the aircrew. The laser transmitters are the heart of the system, 
they basically work to interrupt the infrared signal, or heat. The lasers "blind" the missile's 
eyeball, so it disables the missile's ability to follow the heat source from the plane. 
 
Figure 2-2 LAIRCM mounted C-17 
Figure 2-1 LAIRCM System 
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2.2 LAIRCM System Components (from LAIRCM Test and Evaluation Master Plan, 2010) 
2.2.1 System Processor (SP) 
The SP provides overall control and monitoring of the system (Figure 2-3). It accepts aircrew 
or maintenance commands and data from the CIU to determine system mode and operation. It 
also controls and receives data from the MWS and transmitters for threat acquisition, tracking, 
and jamming. LAIRCM Phase I is a federated system on the aircraft. No data are shared between 
the LAIRCM processor and the mission computer of the aircraft upon which it is installed. As 
shown in Figure 2-11, the LAIRCM processor receives discrete (nonserialized) signals from the 
aircraft for Weight on Wheels (WoW) as a safety interlock to prevent laser emissions or flare 
pulses while the aircraft is on the ground. The LAIRCM processor directly interfaces with the 
ALE-47 flare dispenser via a discrete line to control the dispensing of flares if a laser turret is not 
available to address an attacking threat missile. The LAIRCM 
processor utilizes discrete lines to illuminate the Group A 
Supplemental Crew Alert light in accordance with system logic. 
These lights, typically installed by the aircraft modification (Group 
A) contractor within the field of view of the pilot, enables the pilot 
to rapidly determine if the system has detected a missile threat, or 
has dispensed flares. LAIRCM Phase II retains all the Phase I 
Group A interfaces and adds an Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
interface for the Next Generation (NexGen) MWS subsystem as 
depicted in Figure 2-11. 
The LAIRCM system has a built in attitude reference unit (part of the countermeasures 
processor) and does not require aircraft inertial navigation system data. It does require 
information from the WoW switch to instruct the system to disengage the laser while on the 
ground. The LAIRCM system has the capability to electrically interface with the ALE-47 
countermeasures dispenser system and is connected to the ALE-47 on aircraft that have the flare 
dispenser installed. The aircrew can select either the LAIRCM system or the AAR-47 for 
automatic flare dispense via the ALE-47 in accordance with user tactics and procedures. 
LAIRCM does not affect current AAR-47 and ALE-47 operation when AAR-47 is selected by 
the aircrew. 
2.2.2 Control Indicator Unit (CIU) 
 
Figure 2-4 CIU 
The CIU provides the operator interface to program the LAIRCM 
system for control of the various modes (off, standby, operate) to 
initiate built-in-test (BIT), to display system status, and provide the 
crew with bearing to threat missile launch (Figure 2-4). 
The system is programmed by inserting a smart card 
user data module into the CIU. The CIU has a mode that 
enables the flare system to be used as a backup in case 
the LAIRCM system encounters problems. The 
LAIRCM system has the capability to alert the aircrew 
of a missile engagement. The CIU provides threat 
Figure 2-3 System Processor 
Figure 2-5 CIUR 
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warning aural and visual cues. The display and backlighting may be used under normal cockpit 
illumination or with night vision systems. The CIU utilizes a discrete (non-serialized) control 
line to illuminate the Master Caution Warning light if the system fails. This light is normally 
installed by the aircraft modification (Group A) contractor within the pilot field of view to alert 
the aircrew if the system fails. The replacement CIU is shown in Figure 2-5. 
2.2.3 Missile Warning Sensor (MWS) Subsystem 
The MWS detects and declares threat missiles prior to motor 
burnout (Figure 2-6). The current MWS is the Northrop Grumman 
Corporation (NGC) DIRCM AAR-54 (V) Ultraviolet (UV) Missile 
Warning Subsystem and associated processor card located within 
the system processor. UV sensors mounted on the aircraft provide 
azimuth and elevation coverage to comply with requirements 
contained in the LAIRCM ORD. 
2.2.3.1 NexGen MWS 
The LAIRCM Phase II NexGen MWS is designed to replace the 
AAR-54 (Figure 2-7). The NexGen MWS upgrade will improve the 
existing LAIRCM system’s probability of declaring threat missiles beyond the AMC ORD 
Annex requirements to meet the basic Multi-Command ORD 314-92 requirements. Two 
contractors, NGC and Lockheed Martin, were carried through SDD and NGC was selected as the 
single production contractor.  
Incorporation of the NexGen MWS into the LAIRCM system 
will require Inertial Navigation System (INS) information to be 
provided to the LAIRCM processor. A new Group A interface is 
required to accomplish this task. The LAIRCM system will become a 
bus monitor on the aircraft 1553 data bus so these data can be 
provided to the NexGen MWS subsystem. This Phase II change in 
system architecture is portrayed in Figure 2-11. 
2.2.4 Laser Transmitter Pointer/Tracker subsystem 
The Laser Transmitter Pointer/Tracker subsystem, originally fielded with the LAIRCM 
system, is known as the Small Laser Transmitter Assembly (SLTA). In 2007 the ASC LAIRCM 
Program Office began procuring the Guardian Laser Transmitter Assembly (GLTA) as a 
replacement to the SLTA on some AMC-identified platforms. 
2.2.4.1 Small Laser Transmitter Assembly (SLTA) 
The SLTA is comprised of the NGC ViperTM countermeasures laser and the small transmitter 
(Figure 2-8). The pointer-tracker is designed to track the inbound threat missile and point the 
laser jam source at the missile’s seeker. Threat location information is provided to the transmitter 
by the MWS. The transmitter is the most complex subsystem, and consists of an IR fine track 
sensor (FTS), pointing turret subsystem, and associated communication and control functions. 
The transmitter is equipped with a two-axis gimbal for steering the overall transmitter and an 
additional two-axis mirror system for finer pointing accuracy of the FTS and laser. The laser is 
boresighted to the center of the FTS field of regard. The ViperTM laser subsystem has completed 
development under a USSOCOM contract and is in production. All ViperTM components fit into 
Figure 2-6 AAR-54 
Ultraviolet MWS subsystem 
Figure 2-7 NexGen MWS 
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a 13-inch diameter by 2-inch high chassis, weighing less than 10 lb, the lightest laser available 
for IRCM applications. 
 
Figure 2-8 SLTA 
2.2.4.2 Guardian Laser Transmitter Assembly (GLTA) 
The GLTA initial production order was placed in May 07 with 
deliveries beginning in 2008 Figure 2-9). The GLTA spiral builds on 
NGC independent research and development (IRAD) for the pointer-
tracker program and provides increased supportability, reduced 
production costs, and improved effectiveness compared to the SLTA. 
The LAIRCM GLTA with the ViperTM Laser is a replacement for the 
SLTA on certain platforms, and is compatible with the current MWS 
and the NexGen MWS (LAIRCM Phase II). The LAIRCM processor 
software is also updated within this program to ensure 
interoperability with the GLTA. The objectives of this LAIRCM 
GLTA program (versus SLTA) are: 
• Reduced turret procurement cost 
• Significant reliability improvement 
• 25% weight reduction 
• 2.5/1 drag reduction 
Figure 2-9 GLTA 
Figure 2-10 Viper Laser 
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2.3 Specifications (LAIRCM) 
The specifications for LAIRCM are provided below in Table 2-1 and the system view shown 
in Figure 2-11. 
Table 2-1 Support Requirements Criteria Requirement 
Support Requirement Requirement Actual 
Will perform its mission 95 percent of time 95 percent 
Mean Time Between Maintenance 130 hours >130 hours 
Mean Time Between Removal 1500 hours 650 hours 
Mean Time to Repair NTE 60 minutes 30 minutes 
BIT Accuracy to Correct Subsystem 95 percent 98 percent 
Two levels of maintenance (organizational and depot) 2-level 2-level 
 
Figure 2-11 LAIRCM System View (from LAIRCM Systems Engineering Plan) 
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3 The LAIRCM Story – the Family of IR Countermeasures  
A blacked-out C-130 climbed into the night sky over Baghdad in January 2006 and headed 
toward Kuwait carrying six members of the House Armed Services Committee. Suddenly, a 
shoulder-fired missile streaked toward the plane. “Fortunately the C-130’s onboard 
countermeasures system was one of the most capable available,” an Air Force pilot wrote in a 
report about the incident. It may well be that the lawmakers are alive today because the C-130 
was equipped with LAIRCM—the large-aircraft infrared countermeasure- one of a family of IR 
Countermeasure systems (Figure 3-1). The LAIRCM’s laser “deflected the missile” and the 
attack failed, the pilot reported.  
The threat, meanwhile, continues to grow. During the early months of the Iraq war, Gen. 
John Handy, then chief of the Air Mobility Command, said U.S. military cargo planes were 
being fired on with shoulder-fired missiles and anti-aircraft artillery “on almost a daily basis.” 
At that time, Air Guard planes were equipped with flares and metallic chaff as countermeasures. 
The flares are burning bits of metal that create hot spots in the sky to lure heat-seeking missiles 
away from the hot exhaust of aircraft engines. Chaff is used to confuse missile system radars. 
Those defenses and evasive maneuvering by pilots are enough to keep planes safe from less 
sophisticated MANPADS, as shoulder-fired missiles are often called. But flares are less effective 
against the more sophisticated missiles that have begun showing up in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Pilots have adopted other defenses as well. Flying just above treetop level, for example, gives 
insurgents less time to aim and fire. That tactic reportedly was used to protect former Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld when he flew into Baghdad aboard an MC-130 Combat Talon in 
2003. And instead of making a gradual descent into Baghdad’s or Kabul’s main airport, C-130 
and C-17 pilots often drop into a tight, gut-wrenching corkscrew to avoid becoming targets for 
shoulder-fired missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. 
Nonetheless, at least three large cargo planes have been hit. A commercial cargo plane 
operated by freight carrier DHL was badly damaged in November 2003 while taking off from 
Baghdad. An Air Force C-17 was hit in December 2003, and a C-5 was hit in January 2004. The 
C-17 and the C-5 were hit despite their defensive flares, says Jack Pledger, who is the head of 
infrared countermeasures development at Northrop Grumman. Fortunately, each plane was able 
to land safely. Perhaps U.S. forces have been lucky. The threat of shoulder-fired missiles “has 
outpaced current strategy and available countermeasures,” wrote Air Force Reserve Maj. James 
Whitmire, who analyzed the growing danger to commercial airliners and military planes. 
Thousands of shoulder-fired-missiles “are available on the black market at affordable prices. 
Multiple sources corroborate the fact that these missiles are well within the reach of terrorists,” 
Whitmire wrote. 
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The family of IR countermeasure (IRCM) includes flares, jammers, warning systems, and 
composite IRCM systems (Figure 3-1). 
Systems 
DIRCM 
LAIRCM 
SIIRCM 
TADIRCM 
WIPPS 
Jammers 
AN/AAQ-24 DIRCM 
AN/ALQ-144 CMS 
AN/ALQ-156 MAWS  
AN/ALQ-157 IRCM 
AN/ALQ-204 Matador 
AN/ALQ-211 SIRFC 
AN/ALQ-212 ATIRCM 
AN/QRC-81 IRCM 
AN/QRC-84 IRCM 
Flares 
ASTE 
Comet 
M211 AIRCMM 
M212 AIRCMM 
MK 46 flare 
MJU-7A/B flare 
MJU-27/B flare 
MJU-32/B flare 
MJU-47/B ASTE 
MJU-48/B ASTE 
MJU-49/B flare  
MJU-50/B AIRCM 
MJU-51/B AIRCM 
MJU-52/B BOL-IR 
MJU-53/B ASTE Figure _. The family of IR 
Countermeasures 
Warning Systems 
AN/AAR-44 MAWS 
AN/AAR-47 MAWS 
AN/AAR-54 
AN/AAR-57 CMWS 
 
 
Figure 3-1 The Family of IR Countermeasures 
The US military has recognized the increasing threat to its tactical aircraft from anti-aircraft 
IR guided missiles. 
By one estimate more than 1,000,000 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles exist and are 
available on the worldwide market. The lethality and proliferation of IR surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMS) was demonstrated during the Desert Storm conflict. Approximately 80% of U.S. fixed-
wing aircraft losses in Desert Storm were from ground based Iraqi defensive systems using IR 
SAMS. Both IR SAMS and IR air-to-air missiles have seekers with improved Counter-
Countermeasures (CCM) capabilities that seriously degrade the effectiveness of current 
expendable decoys. MANPADS are the most serious threat to our large, predictable, and slow 
flying air mobility aircraft. These systems are lethal, affordable, easy to use, and difficult to track 
and counter. According to a CIA Report, MANPADS have proliferated worldwide, accounting 
for over 400 casualties in 27 incidents involving civil aircraft over the previous 19 years. This 
proliferation has forced air mobility planners to frequently select less than optimal mission routes 
due to lack of defensive systems on airlift aircraft.  
When an aircraft has been detected, targeted, locked-on, and the missile fired, the emphasis 
has to shift to defeating the in-flight missile. Of course, except in the case of autonomously 
guided missiles, countermeasures against the ground (or hostile aircraft) tracking and command 
guidance system could still be effective (as in the case of conventional RF countermeasures). 
There are already a number of countermeasures against RF seekers.  
MANPADS are shoulder launched missile systems typically include heat seeking or IR 
missiles and are a threat to aircraft and other types of transportation. IR missiles include an IR 
detector, which allows the IR missile to detect and track a target. More particularly, IR missiles 
detect the heat signature (i.e., infrared light) which is emitted by hot structures, for example, 
engines of the aircraft, to track the aircraft in an attack.  
Pyrotechnic flares (Figure 3-1) are used traditionally for this purpose, but have short effective 
time durations. Routinely dispensing flares to draw possible MANPAD missiles away from a 
transport is clearly unacceptable. Dispensing flares or recoverable decoys when an attack is 
detected requires a sophisticated and costly missile attack sensing system. Recurring false alarms 
would likely cause unacceptable hazards from flares to people and property. Tethered decoys 
have also been proposed. Non-predeployed recoverable decoys must be deployed quickly after 
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receiving a warning, which places stringent requirements on the tether line and requires a 
complex release and recovery system. Decoys must also radiate considerable IR power, which 
limits operating duration or requires significant power-carrying capacity by the tether. Fueled 
decoys must be refueled and battery-operated decoys need to be recharged or replaced, requiring 
costly and time-consuming ground operations. Another issue is handling potentially hazardous 
materials at passenger terminals. To be effective, a passive decoy must radiate IR energy at 
levels comparable to or exceeding that of an airliner.  
Conventional MANPAD-launched missiles include an infrared sensor that is sensitive to 
heat, for example the heat emitted from an aircraft engine. The missile is programmed to home in 
on the infrared heat signal using a steering system. Using a rotating reticule as a shutter for the 
sensor, the incoming heat signal is modulated, and, using the modulated signal, an on-board 
processor performs the calculations necessary to steer the missile to its target. Owing to its 
portable size, MANPAD missiles have a limited range, and a burn time of a few seconds from 
launch to extinguishing.  
In recent years, missile guidance systems have become increasingly sophisticated, and, as a 
result, there are a number of different types of missiles in existence. In some embodiments, the 
missile is outfitted with multiple sensors that detect infrared radiation at multiple wavelengths, 
using reticules that are encoded at different patterns.  
In view of the threat, various countermeasure techniques have become popular. A missile 
warning system scans the region for rocket launch signals, such as the infrared or ultraviolet 
signature of a rocket tail. Upon the detection of a missile launch, various countermeasure 
systems are activated. In one example, hot flares or chaff are released from the aircraft to confuse 
the infrared or radar system of the launched missile.  
Other approaches broadcast light energy in order to confuse the missile infrared sensors. In 
one example, light energy emitted by non-coherent flashlamps is directed toward the missile 
sensors, in order to confuse them and render them ineffective ("jamming"). (See Jammers, Figure 
3-1). IR missiles are vulnerable to IR signals which blind the IR detector of the incoming IR 
missile.  
Conventional countermeasures to an IR missile threat include jamming systems which 
confuse or blind the IR missile using either IR lamps and/or IR lasers. These jamming systems 
transmit either a IR signal to blind the IR detector of the incoming IR missile.  
The IR lamp and/or IR laser jamming systems are heavy, complex, consume a great deal of 
power, and require significant space. Real estate in airborne platforms, as well as in most other 
transportation is typically at a premium or may not be available. Further, systems using IR lasers 
include precise pointing and tracking devices, which are hard to implement and produce drag on 
an aircraft platform. Owing to their extremely high cost, such countermeasure systems have 
enjoyed only limited use, primarily on military aircraft. The countermeasure systems are 
commonly integrated into the aircraft, for example, in the fuselage, wing, or nose of the aircraft, 
or fixed onto an outer portion of the aircraft. Depending on where the countermeasure systems 
are mounted to the aircraft, they can lead to an increase in drag, reducing flight performance and 
increasing operating costs. Also, servicing, maintenance, upgrading and testing of the systems 
are expensive and time consuming procedures. In addition, such procedures require grounding of 
each aircraft for a period of time. What is needed is a system that may jam IR missiles and that 
may have reduced size, weight and power (SWAP) requirements. Also needed is a system with a 
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reduced time for pointing and having increased reliability and reduced drag on the aircraft 
platform.  
 The real challenge is posed by the shoulder-launched "fire and forget" type of IR guided 
missiles. In most cases, such missiles require lock-on prior to launch; they do not have 
autonomous reacquisition capability. Given an adequate hemispheric missile warning system, it 
is quite conceivable that the missile can be defeated in flight. One approach is to use an RF 
weapon (directed from the aircraft under attack, or counter-launched) to defeat the guidance 
electronics. For optical or IR seekers that are obviously not "in-band" to the RF weapons, a 
"back-door" means of coupling the RF energy into the attacking missile must be used. Such 
back-door mechanisms exist; however, they are notoriously unpredictable and statistically 
diverse, differing by orders of magnitude from missile to missile, even those of the same class, 
depending on the missile's maintenance history. 
Rather than simply providing a second bright IR source in an attempt to draw an approaching 
missile away from a targeted aircraft, Directed Infrared Countermeasures systems (DIRCM) 
systems use beams of light, produced by a variety of means such as flashlamps, to defeat their 
homing mechanisms (Figure 3-2). In many MANPADS, a reticule within the seeker causes 
pulses of light from the target aircraft to “shine” on the missile’s infrared detector. The IR 
detector senses the IR radiation and sends an electric signal to the guidance package, which 
determines the target location and allows the missile to track the target aircraft’s location and 
movement through the sky. By shining a light towards the seeker, an IRCM system provides the 
infrared detector with energy and “jams” the missile, causing it to miss its intended victim. 
Northrop Grumman’s Nemesis system is a widely-utilized flashlamp-based DIRCM system. 
There are more than 3,000 IRCM systems deployed world-wide that protect against infrared 
guided missile threats.  
 
Figure 3-2 DIRCM (Directed Infrared Countermeasures system) 
Despite the advantages that DIRCM systems have over flares, these systems have limitations 
that have prompted a move towards laser-based systems, such as the Navy’s TADIRCM system 
and the Air Force’s LAIRCM system. LAIRCM builds upon the NEMESIS platform but replaces 
the flashlamp source of IR radiation with a laser source Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3 ViperTM laser replacement for the SLTA flash system 
Another approach is to use a laser to attack the threat. For highly dynamic aircraft that can 
maneuver to avoid the threat, it may suffice to simply blind the missile and assume it can be 
avoided. Current systems confuse missiles with IR energy, making the missile wobble in flight, 
but not necessarily break lock. 
Whereas susceptibility reduction (hit avoidance) should be regarded as the primary means of 
aircraft defense, optimal survivability can be achieved through an integration of susceptibility 
and vulnerability reduction (hit survival) techniques. Vulnerability reduction techniques are 
particularly important for commercial aircraft in that the use of flares and rapid G-maneuvers is 
not appropriate. However, some solutions may prove applicable to all aircraft and threats 
encountered.  
The application of well thought out Modeling and Simulation can balance requirements and 
mitigate risks associated with complex systems. In 1995 NG engineers knew the laser was 
coming along; however it was not at a Technology Readiness Level of 9 (actual system “flight 
proven” through successful mission operations). NG built in the laser channel and in 1999-2000 
the laser technology matured; by 2001 they were integrating the laser into the turret and auto 
bore sight. The system was fully integrated by the summer of 2002. Similar Modeling and 
Simulation occurred on the transition from UV to IR. Another Modeling and Simulation success 
story was in the development of the ViperTM laser. NG was able to show via Modeling and 
Simulation the 10lb ViperTM could protect the C-17 compared to a competitor’s 65lb device that 
was three times the cost. Without sound Modeling and Simulation, these data could not have 
been produced without actually building and demonstrating the devices. 
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3.1 Program History 
Table 3-1 LAIRCM History of Significant Events 
       USAF identifies requirement to improve protection of large aircraft against IR-guided missile threats 1998 
LAIRCM Phase I acquisition strategy approved by Aeronautical Systems Center ASC Commander 2000 
ASC/CC approved the LAIRCM Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum 2001 
Award of the LAIRCM Group B contract on 28 Sep 01 to NGC for the LAIRCM Phase I program 2001 
NGC to perform aircraft modification (Group A) development and integration of the LAIRCM system 
on C-130 aircraft 
2002 
AMC issued a Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) for accelerated IRCM capability 2002 
SAF/AQQ issued program direction to execute a LAIRCM “Lite” installation on 12 C-17 aircraft 2002 
AMC identified a need to equip as many C-17s with LAIRCM protection as soon as possible 2004 
SAF/AQ issued interim program direction to equip up to an additional 59 C-17s with LAIRCM “Lite” 2004 
SAF/AQ approved LAIRCM GuardianTM Laser Trans Assembly (GLTA) sole source award to NGC 2004 
LAIRCM SPO was designated as the LAIRCM Program Office under 516th ASW Aeronautical 
Systems Wing. 
 
2005 
Air Force Acquisition Executive (AFAE) provided direction to proceed with production of the GLTA 2007 
NexGen MWS Milestone C decision was made 2008 
LAIRCM unfunded PDM III Study identified operational requirement for the Mobility Air Forces 
(MAF) 
2009 
Viper ™ Laser 2.1 service life projected to 3500 hr MTBR 
 
2011 
LAIRCM evaluated on KC-135; pod does not interfere with refueling probe dynamics (Figure 3-4) 2011 
 
 
Figure 3-4 KC-135R with Aerial Refueling Boom and LAIRCM (mounted on under belly) 
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3.2 Evolutionary Phases 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) developed the DIRCM 
system to protect C-130 sized and smaller aircraft against Infrared (IR)-guided missiles. This 
system uses a pointer/tracker (P/T) assembly to direct flash-lamp light energy on IR-guided 
threat missile seekers. This technique allows for significantly higher levels of IR jam energy 
compared to aircraft signature to be directed on IR threats and has resulted in increased 
technique effectiveness. LAIRCM is shown below (Figure 3-5) on a C-17. 
 
Figure 3-5 LAIRCM mounted on the underside of a C-17 
The USSOCOM/United Kingdom (UK) DIRCM program incorporated a laser transmit path 
in the DIRCM P/T. With a laser installed in the DIRCM, significantly higher levels of jam 
energy became available. The LAIRCM program leverages and improves upon the DIRCM 
program by incorporating a laser onto the DIRCM small transmitter and providing the energy 
required for large aircraft protection. LAIRCM also uses other DIRCM components including 
the processor, the Control Indicator Unit, and the AAR-54 Missile Warning System (MWS). 
Leveraging the USSOCOM DIRCM solution enabled a near-term solution to Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) requirements. The LAIRCM system is a common solution for both C-17 and 
C-130 aircraft, providing both supportability and interchangeability benefits. LAIRCM offers 
increased effectiveness and growth for C-130 aircraft that could be leveraged by USSOCOM in 
improving the current DIRCM flash-lamp capabilities. 
LAIRCM is an evolutionary acquisition program. The LAIRCM Phase I acquisition strategy 
was approved by the Aeronautical Systems Center Commander (ASC/CC) on 16 Aug 00, as the 
LAIRCM Designated Acquisition Commander (DAC) at the LAIRCM Acquisition Strategy 
Panel. The approved strategy included conducting a full and open competition for award of a 
single LAIRCM Group B system integration contract with production and sustainment options.  
The LAIRCM evolutionary acquisition strategy balances AMC’s documented urgent and 
compelling need with the ultimate goal of increased effectiveness and affordability. To 
accomplish this balance, the LAIRCM program is comprised of three phases:  
1. Phase I is a system comprised of proven and available subsystems, previously developed 
under the UK/USSOCOM DIRCM program to satisfy AMC’s urgent and compelling need.  
2. The Phase II program provides a solution to the evolutionary requirements not fully 
addressed during the Phase I program. The Phase II improvements will be accomplished through 
spiral development to satisfy the need for increased effectiveness with improved missile warning 
and new jamming techniques. 
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3. Implementation of Phase III capabilities will be authorized as funded and directed by 
operational commands and SAF/AQQ. Phase III is a reliability improvement and Life Cycle  
Cost (LCC) reduction phase. Projects funded are the CIUR, ViperTM 2.1 and LSPR. The 
LAIRCM Phase I system is a derivative of the AN/AAQ-24 (V) DIRCM that was jointly 
developed by the UK and USSOCOM. The current LAIRCM Phase I system is being installed 
on AMC, AFRC, and ANG C-5/C-130/C-17/C-20/C-40, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Challenger, United States Army (USA) C-37 and Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC) CV-22/ 
AC-130/MC-130 platforms.  
The Next Generation (NexGen) MWS Phase II spiral is aimed at improving AN/AAQ-24 (V) 
system effectiveness by developing a new MWS. Since improved missile warning is a common 
requirement for both the United States Air Force (USAF) and USSOCOM, the NexGen MWS 
development was accomplished as a cooperative program with both agencies contributing 
funding. The MWS upgrade was accomplished with a competitive System Development & 
Demonstration (SDD) using a simulation-based acquisition approach to plan for Modeling and 
Simulation throughout the acquisition life cycle. As a result of a source selection, SDD contracts 
were awarded to both NGC and Lockheed Martin. Choosing two contractors mitigated 
performance and cost risk and provided potential competition for follow on production.  
3.3 Acquisition History 
Subsequent to Operational Requirements Document approval, AMC submitted a $6.8 million 
FY01 Program Objective Memorandum initiative for LAIRCM. In Jul 99, the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force (CSAF) tasked AMC and AFMC to investigate and provide an affordable solution 
to protect AMC aircraft. In Oct 99, ASC/CC presented a proposed LAIRCM program 
development and acquisition approach balancing urgency with affordability to the Secretary of 
the Air Force (SECAF), CSAF, and SAF/AQ. SECAF supported this proposal and presented it to 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense in Nov 99. In Dec 99, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
approved Program Budget Decision 743, funding the first 20 AMC aircraft. In Feb 00, the 
President’s FY01 budget included funding for LAIRCM.  
The LAIRCM program was initiated as an FY01 New Start. Congressional notification 
occurred through the President’s FY01 budget submission with inclusion of the LAIRCM 
program in the Research Development Test and Evaluation budget item justification for Program 
Element 0401130F, C-17 aircraft, Project 4886. The Source Selection Authority approved the 
basis for contract award, selection factors, and scope of evaluation by approving the LAIRCM 
Source Selection Plan (SSP) on 22 Oct 00 (further amended by SSP amendments 1 and 2 on 20 
Jan 01 and 2 Sep 01, respectively).  
At the 26 Mar 01 CSAF Quarterly Acquisition Program Review, CSAF expressed concern 
over LAIRCM affordability. CSAF tasked a reexamination of LAIRCM requirements and 
affordability. On 30 Mar 01, as a means to address the CSAF tasking, ASAF(A) directed a 
modification to the LAIRCM RFP allowing LAIRCM offerors the opportunity to submit separate 
alternate proposals for performance-based solutions. On 7 May 01, the LAIRCM team issued an 
RFP amendment authorizing offerors to submit separate alternate proposals. The Source 
Selection Evaluation Team completed evaluations of all baseline and alternate proposals on 
7 Sep 01. On 27 Sep 01, the LAIRCM Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), ASC/CC approved 
the LAIRCM Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum, authorizing entry into SDD. This 
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decision enabled award of the LAIRCM Group B contract on 28 Sep 01 to NGC for the 
LAIRCM Phase I program. The scope of the development effort under the NGC LAIRCM 
contract included developing, integrating, testing and supporting installation of LAIRCM 
systems on two C-17 and one C-130 aircraft during the SDD acquisition phase. The contract also 
included production options for LAIRCM shipsets (which are complete systems ready to be 
installed), spares, support equipment, C-130 modifications and installations, C-17 installation 
support, program management, engineering support and interim contractor support. This change 
to the original LAIRCM strategy was approved by the LAIRCM DAC on 15 Mar 02. The 
LAIRCM alternate solution was chosen by the LAIRCM DAC because it offers a high degree of 
commonality with the USSOCOM DIRCM program.  
A separate contract modification to NGC, signed 7 Jun 02, tasked NGC to perform aircraft 
modification (Group A) development and integration of the LAIRCM system on C-130 aircraft. 
This modification took advantage of the existing C-130 design and installation performed by 
NGC on the DIRCM program for AFSOC C-130 aircraft. NGC subcontracted the Group A 
design work to Lockheed-Martin Owego, with the installations to be accomplished at Crestview 
Aerospace in Crestview, Florida. Crestview Aerospace, a small business concern, is Lockheed 
Martin’s subcontractor for the C-130 LAIRCM modification. C-17 Group A development and 
integration of the LAIRCM system is performed by The Boeing Company Long Beach under 
contract to the C-17 program office Mobility Directorate (ASC/ WLM), C-17 Division, Mobility 
Directorate. NGC, in accordance with their Associate Contractor Agreement (ACA) with 
Boeing, provides C-17 installation support on a Time and Material (T&M) basis. 
As part of the LAIRCM Milestone C decision, 22 Aug 02, the LAIRCM PM received MDA 
approval to increase the total Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantity by one additional 
system, bringing the LRIP total to 13 LAIRCM systems. This single shipset increase was 
necessary to support the accelerated LAIRCM installs on the C-17. On 7 Nov 02, AMC issued a 
Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) for accelerated IRCM capability. This mission need 
was approved by CSAF on 27 Nov 02.  
SAF/AQQ then issued program direction to execute a LAIRCM “Lite” installation on C-17 
aircraft on 13 Dec 02. LAIRCM-Lite is a C-17 program that uses a combination of laser jammers 
and flares due to the limited availability of LAIRCM components. 
During 2003-2004, 12 C-17s were modified and fielded in the C-17 LAIRCM “Lite” 
configuration. In Jan 04, AMC identified a need to equip as many C-17s with LAIRCM 
protection as soon as possible. In May 04, the LAIRCM System Program Office (SPO) proposed 
an extension to the existing Quick Reaction Capability being fielded under the Nov 02 CMNS. 
This extension proposed equipping up to 59 additional C-17s with LAIRCM “Lite.” SAF/AQ 
and CSAF concurred with this plan. In Nov 04, SAF/AQ issued interim program direction to 
equip up to an additional 59 C-17s with LAIRCM “Lite” using a combination of existing C-17 
funds and other funds that might be made available and directed for this purpose. In Sep 04, 
Congress approved an above threshold reprogramming to field 18 additional C-17 LAIRCM 
“Lite” systems.  
On 9 Nov 04, SAF/AQ approved LAIRCM GuardianTM Laser Transmitter Assembly 
(GLTA) Class Justification and Authorization for other than Full and Open Competition for the 
GLTA acquisition program to award sole source contracts to NGC, Defense Systems Division, 
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Rolling Meadows, IL. On 18 May 07, the Air Force Acquisition Executive (AFAE) provided 
direction to proceed with production of the GLTA and to have this effort managed by the Air 
Force Program Executive Officer for Aircraft (AFPEO/AC). Within 1 week, the LAIRCM 
Program Office) awarded NGC an initial production contract for 56 GLTAs. 
In Dec 04, ASC/CC was designated as the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Aircraft 
(AFPEO/AC), reporting directly to ASAF (A) for management of the LAIRCM program. In Feb 
05, the LAIRCM SPO was designated as the LAIRCM Program Office under the 516th 
Aeronautical Systems Wing. On 18 Apr 05, AFPEO/AC approved entrance of LAIRCM Phase I 
into FRP. Phase I production by LAIRCM Program Office includes installation on AMC C-17, 
C-130, C-5, and C-40 aircraft; AFSOC MC-130; AFRC and ANG C-130s; FAA and Foreign 
Military Sales aircraft; and other aircraft as directed and funded. In addition, derivative LAIRCM 
systems are being acquired by other procurement agencies for USA C-37, USSOCOM CV-22 
and MH-53, UK C-17, and Australian AF Wedgetail (DIRCM Direct Commercial Sales) aircraft. 
The NexGen MWS Milestone B decision was made in Jun 04 and the NexGen MWS 
Milestone C decision was made May 08. The NexGen sensor achieved a FRP decision under the 
DoN LAIRCM program no further milestone decisions are required by the Air Force. On 11 May 
06, LAIRCM Program Office awarded a 5-year, $3.2 billion Indefinite Delivery Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contract to NGC. The IDIQ contract includes Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Cost Plus 
Fixed Fee, T&M, and Cost Reimbursement (CR) type contract line items in support of 
acquisitions for the following: LAIRCM systems, aircraft modification kits, aircraft 
modifications and system installations, aircraft integration support, studies and analyses, spares, 
support equipment, technical data, training courses, field support, repairs, contractor systems 
engineering/program management, hardware and software design, and engineering changes 
including production incorporation of spiral developments. The type of contract utilized is 
appropriate for the efforts involved (e.g., high-risk and development activities will use CR, 
production will use FFP, investigative studies and support activities such as interim contractor 
support will use T&M contract types).  
3.4 Test and Evaluation (T&E) Overview 
The baseline Phase I LAIRCM system Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) has been 
successfully completed. These test results provided the data needed to perform an Operational 
Assessment (OA) in FY02 and to certify readiness for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
(IOT&E) in FY04. LAIRCM Phase I IOT&E was completed by the Air Force Operational Test 
and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) on C-17 aircraft (Feb-Mar 04) and on C-130 aircraft (Jun-Jul 
04). The AFOTEC final report rated LAIRCM as “Effective and Suitable” with all Critical 
Operational Issues rated as Satisfactory. The GLTA successfully accomplished live missile fire 
tests between May-Jun 06 and flight tests between Sep-Oct 06 on a C-17. AFOTEC performed 
an OA and submitted a report in early 07.  
Throughout NexGen MWS SDD performance, assessments were accomplished using a 
variety of test assets with the overall effectiveness evaluation being digital simulation. A live 
missile firing test (May-Jun 06) and a C-130 flight test (Aug-Sep 06) were successfully 
completed for both SDD systems. A production NexGen system has been selected and installed 
on a C-17; this aircraft has undergone integration testing at Edwards AFB (Sep-Oct 09). In an 
effort to determine whether to use active cooling or passive cooling of the NexGen MWS 
sensors, a C-17 thermal test was conducted at Yuma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Yuma, 
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AZ in Jul07 and Jul 09. Based on analysis of test results, LAIRCM Engineering has elected to 
accept the low risk associated with passive cooling options. 
3.5 Interfaces with Other Programs 
During Phase I, the LAIRCM system was being installed on C-17 and C-130 aircraft. The 
aircraft Group A provisions designed and developed to accommodate the LAIRCM Group B 
components must be properly interfaced with and integrated. Cockpit Working Groups (CWG) 
were established for both the C-17 and C-130. In the case of the C-17, “Boeing performed install 
locations (of the LAIRCM display) before NGC was under contract and didn’t really know 
where things belonged and how they were used,” according to NGC’s Dave Snodgrass. As a 
result, the LAIRCM control indicator unit display in the C-17 had to be mounted down and to the 
left of the pilot in the C-17. The pilot cannot see it directly without turning and looking down. In 
addition, because of its design (the top surface had a raised knob and a flap that opened and 
accepted the User Data Module card) and location, flight deck personnel often stepped on the 
unit which affected its reliability and operation. The CIU has now been redesigned (see Figure 
2-5), the surface is flat and it incorporates texted information incorporated on a small screen. 
Currently in the C-17 there is an indication with a tiny display just beneath the glare shield 
that simply lights the word acronym MSL (which stands for "missile") on both the pilot's and the 
co-pilot's sides of the flight deck. This indicates to the pilots that LAIRCM has been activated 
and performing its function. Also, some aircraft, like the C-130 have elected to have an audio 
alert that says "missile launched" to give further indication, but the C-17 community has elected 
to not use that feature, according to the ASC LAIRCM Program Office. 
 
The C-17 Group A design and development portion of the program was accomplished by the 
C-17 original equipment manufacturer, The Boeing Company. The C-17 Division placed Boeing 
under contract for this activity in Jan 02. Two C-17 aircraft were modified and tested with the 
LAIRCM system as part of this contract. A C-17 Group A modification and installation contract 
was awarded to Boeing in FY03 to modify and install the LAIRCM system on 10 additional  
C-17 aircraft and in FY05 Boeing was awarded another contract to install LAIRCM on an 
additional 18 aircraft (total C-17 installs). The LAIRCM Program Office continues to contract 
for and execute procurement of additional LAIRCM systems and support equipment for C-17 
aircraft as LAIRCM Program Office receives funds from the C-17 Division. The C-17 Division 
continues to contract for C-17 Group A and aircraft modifications.  
Since the C-17 Group A development was contracted separately to The Boeing Company  
(C-17 manufacturer), a strong relationship between NGC (the LAIRCM Group B developer) and 
The Boeing Company was built through an Associate Contractor Agreement (ACA). This is a 
contract requirement in both contracts, ensuring the LAIRCM Group B and C-17 Group A 
contractors share interface and integration information, and builds a high degree of confidence 
that installed LAIRCM performance will meet AMC operational needs. This approach also 
builds strong IPT relationships.  
The LAIRCM C-130 Group A acquisition strategy changed to contract with NGC for 
accomplishing the C-130 Group A design and development, with options for production 
installation since NGC was responsible for the original C-130 DIRCM design and installation. 
This strategy change offered significant cost and schedule savings and reduced risk for the 
LAIRCM program.  
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NGC performed the C-130 Group A design and development effort for LAIRCM. This 
approach was chosen due to the commonality with USSOCOM ongoing design and installation 
on similar C-130 aircraft. This commonality enables the LAIRCM Program Office to leverage 
existing C-130 installation designs developed by NGC for the USSOCOM DIRCM program and 
apply them to the C-130 LAIRCM installation. This strategy change saved the USAF $12.5 
million, completed the C-130 design and trial installation portion of the LAIRCM program 22 
months earlier, and offered significantly lower risk due to use of an existing, approved, and 
proven design.  
For all future aircraft types, the LAIRCM acquisition strategy is for the aircraft modification 
contractor (Group A) and the LAIRCM Group B contractor to establish an ACA, share aircraft 
interface and integration data, and jointly plan the aircraft ground, flight, and acceptance tests. 
This approach was used with the C-5. In Jan 05, LAIRCM Program Office began working to 
integrate LAIRCM onto the C-5 using a similar approach as C-17 integration, utilizing an ACA 
between Lockheed-Martin (C-5 manufacturer) and NGC (the LAIRCM Group A developer).  
The ASC/WL Mobility Directorate and USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition and 
Logistics Center Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Fixed Wing have a Program Specific 
Memorandum of Agreement (PSMOA) for the NexGen Acquisition Program. Under this 
PSMOA, NexGen will be jointly funded and LAIRCM Program Office will lead this joint team 
in the development, test, and acquisition of NexGen MWS.  
To motivate the contractor during the Phase I development program, the contract with NGC 
successfully employed an incentive fee profit arrangement. As the program has evolved to a 
production-oriented phase with a stable baseline configuration, these incentives are no longer 
required. In addition, on-going upgrades and enhancements to the technical baseline of the 
system are modest in scope, when compared to the development program, with clearly 
understood objectives and low-to-moderate technical risk. This type of development is suitable 
for other than incentive fee profit strategies; to include both fixed-fee and award-fee structured 
contracts. Contractor performance is motivated through the Contractor Performance Assessment 
Report and continued justifiable opportunities for sole-source contracts. 
3.6 NexGen MWS Business Strategy 
For the Phase II NexGen MWS effort, LAIRCM Program Office awarded two SDD 
contracts–one to NGC and one to Lockheed Martin respectively. Choosing two offerors 
mitigated cost, schedule and performance risk, and provided potential competition for the follow-
on production phase. The SDD contract type was Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) for both. CPIF 
contracts were appropriate for this acquisition considering the desired outcome and the risks 
identified to achieving that outcome while providing each contractor with some level of cost 
control incentive. 
The LAIRCM DT&E for GLTA and NexGen MWS and future programs consists of 
Analysis, Measurements, M&S, Production Qualification Testing, Performance Verification 
Testing, HITL testing, uninstalled SIL testing, open-air range testing, live missile fire testing, 
and acceptance testing. The integrated tests are designed to identify any anomalies in the system 
and to establish LAIRCM installed performance. Developmental testing (DT) includes SIL, 
HITL, live missile fire, and installed LAIRCM performance.  
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The LAIRCM Phase I program has completed Milestone C and is in FRP. Spiral 
developments will be accomplished in parallel with FRP. Changes will be phased into production 
as they become available. 
3.7 Evolutionary Acquisition Objectives 
LAIRCM Phase I program objectives include: 
• Maximize use of non-developmental items to field a self-protection capability as soon as 
possible. 
• Meet AMC ORD Annex (a subset of LAIRCM ORD) requirements for a Phase I 
LAIRCM system. 
• Develop, test, and integrate the Phase I LAIRCM system on two C-17 and one C-130 
aircraft during an SDD acquisition phase. 
• Produce, support, modify, and deliver additional C-17 and C-130 LAIRCM protected 
aircraft as soon as possible following the SDD acquisition phase until Phase II production 
begins. 
• Reduce cost and improve reliability of the LAIRCM Laser Transmitter Assembly.  
• Plan an affordable, incremental upgrade path (Phase II) to protect additional AMC 
aircraft and meet remaining ORD requirements. 
• The procurement of Group B hardware to support installation on the C-5, C-17, C-37, C-
40, C-130, C-130J, AMC, AFRC, ANG, and FAA aircraft, and to accomplish installation 
of Group B onto FMS and C-130 aircraft based upon approved funding and direction. 
LAIRCM Phase II program objectives include incremental upgrades to: 
• Improve the LAIRCM system’s probability of declaring threat missiles beyond the AMC 
ORD Annex requirements to meet the basic Multi-Command ORD 314-92 requirements. 
• Develop, test, and integrate additional techniques for the LAIRCM Phase I and Phase II 
systems to extend countermeasure capability beyond the AMC ORD Annex Tier I threat 
requirements to meet the basic Multi-Command ORD 314-92 requirements. 
• Develop, test, and integrate the Phase II LAIRCM system onto additional aircraft as 
directed by AMC, USSOCOM/AFSOC and other appropriate agencies (i.e., USA, USN, 
DHS, etc). 
• Group B hardware to support installation on the C-5, C-17, C-37, C-40, C-130, C-130J, 
AMC, AFRC, ANG, FAA and FMS aircraft based upon approved funding.  
3.8 Source Selection Strategy 
3.8.1 FRP-Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
For follow-on production, ASC/WLYE has direction from SAF/AQQ to install LAIRCM on 
up to 444 AMC aircraft as congressional funding is appropriated. ASC/WLY will execute 
contracts to procure LAIRCM configurations for the approved LAIRCM configuration baseline 
for LAIRCM installations on platforms to include: C-17, C-130 variants, C-130J, C-5, C-40,  
C-37, KC-135, KC-10, RC-135, E-8C, Army, Navy, Marine Corps (platforms as specified and 
funded by the services), and FMS aircraft. ASC/WYL will procure LAIRCM equipment for 
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other government agencies, as approved by the Program Executive Officer (PEO), to include the 
DHS and FAA. 
This contract with NGC has been negotiated and provides for acquisitions in support of the 
overall AN/AAQ-24(V) LAIRCM program on an IDIQ basis for a 5 year period. The IDIQ 
contract has a ceiling value of $3.2B. This IDIQ contract is the primary vehicle used to acquire 
the items set forth in the Justification and Approval (J&A) for Other Than Full and Open 
Competition. 
IDIQ acquisitions provided for include the following: LAIRCM systems/subsystems, aircraft 
modification kits, hardware and software design, aircraft modification design, aircraft 
modification, system installation, aircraft integration support, studies and analyses, spares, 
support equipment, technical data, logistics support, training courses, contractor systems 
engineering/program management support, hardware and software design, and engineering 
changes including production incorporation of spiral developments. The predominant contracting 
activity under the IDIQ contract is expected to be procurement of LAIRCM Group B hardware. 
3.8.2 Phase III  
Phase III will implement modernization activities driven by reliability and LCC issues. 
3.9 Risk Management 
The LAIRCM program office Risk Management Process is documented in an RMP. This 
replaces an informal process that included reviews of program risks associated with cost, 
schedule, and performance. The RMP includes a process to check status and to track program 
risks and to establish risk management metrics. 
The RMP serves to identify possible risk items early and to aid in developing mitigation 
plans. Once identified, technical risks will be closely monitored and closure plans assessed to 
ensure proper, cost-effective risk management, mitigation, or elimination. Risks will be cross 
correlated into the categories of cost, schedule, and performance where the impact is most likely 
to occur. 
Once risks are identified, rated, and categorized, mitigation metrics will be prepared and 
progress will be periodically measured. 
ASC/CC policy memorandum #06-016, 3 Oct 06, requires performance of an annual 
integrated risk assessment and that all serious or high risk hazards be reported to the PEO or 
AFAE. There are no serious or high risk hazards identified for the LAIRCM program, as 
confirmed by the annual assessment. 
3.9.1 LAIRCM Program Risk 
The LAIRCM program has already overcome the originally predicted program risks with 
laser development and aircraft integration. The major technical risks remaining concern the 
performance and integration of the Phase II development efforts. 
3.9.1.1 Laser Development Risk 
During FY02, USSOCOM experienced cost growth due to the need to resolve performance 
issues traceable to the ViperTM laser design. To mitigate risk to the LAIRCM contract and 
program, ASC/WLYE transferred $2M to USSOCOM’s DIRCM program office to help fund the 
28 
cost growth proposal to complete the ViperTM laser development. In addition, the LAIRCM 
contract modification for reliability growth testing of the ViperTM laser to identify inherent 
design, process, or parts problems reduced the risk of the laser development and production 
transition. Finally, through monitoring NGC Laser Systems efforts to continue to improve the 
manufacturing processes associated with the ViperTM laser, the LAIRCM program office 
significantly reduced risk in this area. These efforts have mitigated the cost and schedule risk of 
ViperTM laser development and production risk. 
3.9.1.2 Aircraft Integration Risk 
The primary technical risk the program overcame was LAIRCM integration on the C-17; this 
risk did not exist on the C-130 since NGC had already accomplished DIRCM installation on the 
C-130. The C-17 installation was a new design and the key risk in the integration was the 
location of the LAIRCM CIU, or Control Indicator Unit (Fig 2-4). As discussed in Section 3.5, 
LAIRCM came along after the cockpit displays had already been designed and installed in the  
C-17. There was no readily available real estate for the CIU. A small indicator under the glare 
shield of both the pilot and co-pilot indicates when a missile has been detected by LAIRCM. 
Another design risk involves the C-17 vibration environment, particularly for the tail cone 
installation of the LAIRCM SLTA.  
Vibration risk reduction testing on a C-17 was conducted in Jun 02; all vibration levels and 
increased drag were found acceptable. Integration risks remain for integration of subsequent 
platforms (e.g. C-5, C-40, and C-130J). 
3.9.2 NexGen MWS Program Risk 
The overall risks associated with the NexGen MWS acquisition are assessed as low, based on 
extensive market research, and multiple testing opportunities included in the SDD program. The 
AIRCM program team participated in a Risk Assessment Workshop in 2003 with ASC 
Acquisition Center of Excellence personnel, senior center advisors, a cross-functional team from 
the program office, and the operational customer. Of the 103 potential risks identified during the 
workshop, no risks were identified as high and only three risk areas were identified as issues 
requiring mitigation. The primary program risk drivers include: 
• Development of a NexGen MWS DSM and integration of the DSM with environment 
models resulting in digital simulations – now complete. 
• The installed NexGen MWS system meets aircraft spatial coverage requirements without 
the need for additional sensors and additional aircraft modifications. 
3.9.3 GLTA Program Risk 
The overall risks associated with the GLTA acquisition are assessed as low since the GLTA 
is currently in production. 
3.9.4 Engineering and Technical Risk Mitigation 
3.9.4.1 Systems Engineering Approach 
As stated in the foreword to this Case Study, systems engineering includes making key 
system and design trades early in the process to establish the system architecture. In the case of 
the displaced CIU for LAIRCM in the C-17, the technology simply came along after the controls 
and panels had been designed for the aircraft. As a result, the display is not in direct sight of the 
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pilot. Not everything can be placed front and center of the pilots. This has been somewhat 
resolved by the installation of a small missile indicator display under the glare shield which the 
pilots may perceive depending on their cockpit workload. 
Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and assess architectural 
alternatives at the introductory stage of a program. The ViperTM laser was modeled, simulated, 
and then demonstrated by NGC that it could successfully protect the C-17. Good systems 
engineering was also demonstrated when NGC “pre-plumbed” the laser channel for LAIRCM 
prior to the completed development of the laser module, anticipating its integration into 
LAIRCM at a future date. This forward planning resulted in cost and schedule savings while 
meeting performance standards.  
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs of a system like LAIRCM are the management of interfaces and integration 
of subsystems. However, successful design, development and production are not always enough 
to sustain a system throughout its life cycle. Sound Human Systems Integration applied early in 
the program can help mitigate disasters later on. Sound systems engineering was applied to the 
upgrade of the transmitter/tracker system. In 1995 NG engineers knew the Viper™ laser was 
coming along however it was not at a TRL of 9. NG built in the laser channel and in 1999-2000 
the laser technology matured and by 2001 they were integrating the laser into the turret and auto 
bore sight. The A kits fit into the old B slots. NG had both function and fit. There was no cost to 
modify the aircraft for their kit to fit in the slot provided. NG’s secret was they built their system 
to stand alone so it did not have to interface with the a/c mission computer. The system was fully 
integrated by the summer of 2002. Similar planning occurred on the transition of the MWS from 
UV to IR.  
Excessive turnover of Air Force Systems Program Office personnel lead to a breakdown of 
communications with AMC and NGC and led to impacts to the program cost, schedule, and 
performance. In the LAIRCM program, the constant Air Force turnover was dramatic in the eyes 
of the contractor. There was a gradual degradation of the relationship NGC had with the SPO. 
Because of the inefficiency in the SPO due to constant personnel turnover, NGC felt SOCOM 
funding for LAIRCM was jeopardized. The new SPO team lost about 1-yr of executing the 
program due to schooling up time and learning the ropes. Since 2009 the LAIRCM technical 
philosophy is one of having a government/contractor team functioning under a single, unified 
system engineering approach. This approach is centered on the following premises: 
• NGC is responsible for development of the LAIRCM system as documented in the 
LAIRCM system specification. NGC is also responsible for minimizing any impacts to 
other aircraft subsystems/systems when integrated. 
• The Boeing Company, Long Beach is responsible for design and development of 
LAIRCM Group A provisions on the C-17 aircraft in accordance with the LAIRCM 
Group B ICD. They are also responsible for minimizing any Group A impacts to the 
LAIRCM Group B performance, as tested and verified against the LAIRCM system 
specification. 
• NGC is responsible for design and development of LAIRCM Group A provisions on the 
C-130 aircraft in accordance with the LAIRCM Group B ICD. NGC is responsible for 
minimizing any Group A impacts to the LAIRCM Group B performance, as tested and 
verified against the LAIRCM system specification. 
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• Lockheed-Martin is responsible for design and development of LAIRCM Group A 
provisions on the C-5 aircraft in accordance with the LAIRCM Group B ICD. They are 
also responsible for minimizing any Group A impacts to the LAIRCM Group B 
performance, as tested and verified against the LAIRCM system specification. 
• Comprehensive subsystem/system-level testing to verify system performance and ensure 
qualification to the aircraft operating environments. 
The IPT will use the contractor’s technical performance measures to assess progress and 
manage the requirements established in the system specification. 
Installed LAIRCM functional performance was verified and validated by the 
contractor/government test team, including Boeing for the C-17 and NGC for the C-130, during 
C-17 and C-130 ground and flight testing. Once the C-5/LAIRCM design is established, the 
necessary installation and performance characteristics will be verified and validated. The C-5, 
C17, and C-130 program offices are responsible for weapon system OSS&E on their respective 
platforms. 
3.9.4.2 Configuration Management 
ASC/WLYE controls the configuration of LAIRCM at the system specification level. Each 
aircraft platform (i.e., C-17, C-130) maintains aircraft configuration management. The LAIRCM 
contractor managed the configuration and controlled the allocated and product baselines during 
development and continues to do so during production. During on-aircraft integration and test 
activities, the Government retains approval authority for all configuration changes. Sustainment 
accomplished by contractor depot support will continue for the foreseeable future. Efforts are 
underway to determine the long-term strategy for sustainment as discussed in paragraph 3.9.4.4 
below. 
3.9.4.3 Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
M&S has been the principal means of verification of LAIRCM subsystem and system 
performance. Reliance on HITL simulation facilities is the primary means to verify the 
performance of the laser jamming subsystem against the system specification. Facilities such as 
the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator in Fort Worth TX and the Guided 
Weapons Evaluation Facility at Eglin AFB FL allow thousands of missile engagements to be 
performed, in a cost effective manner, using actual LAIRCM laser hardware in these HITL 
facilities, results in statistically relevant verification testing, not possible or affordable in any 
other method of test. The performance verification of the LAIRCM missile warning subsystems 
will rely on contractor digital models used in design verification tests (DVT) and HITL tests. 
Reliance on the LAIRCM Group B contractor’s SIL validates missile warning handoff accuracy 
and tracking accuracy prior to flight testing. 
3.9.4.4 Sustaining the LAIRCM 
The sustainment of the LAIRCM will be formally transitioned to WR-ALC Robins AFB, 
GA, in 2016. The Air Force’s plan for sustainment differs from that of the Navy. The Navy has a 
“cradle-to-grave” philosophy on a system’s lifecycle. One advantage of this approach, according 
to contacts at WR-ALC, is the Navy plans the sustainment of a weapon system up front during 
the initial planning for a program. The Air Force philosophy of transitioning systems to the 
sustainers after Milestone C is proper planning and funding to sustain the system has been 
problematic in that the sustainers have been left out of the early planning and funding to sustain 
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the system being short-changed. The WR-ALC personnel saw an advantage to the Navy’s single 
manager concept especially after Milestone C. The private/public 50/50 sharing of depot level 
maintenance (10 USC 2466) was also discussed at the WR-ALC with respect to LAIRCM. This 
rule requires doing at least 50 percent depot maintenance in-house using organic government 
organizations. As a result, contractors can then perform only the remaining 50 percent. The 
purpose of the code is to assure a core logistics capability for the government. The rule has led to 
some awkward arrangements at WR-ALC. In one case, government personnel have to be 
escorted by NGC personnel into areas of NGC-proprietary equipment at WR-ALC. 
Data rights and data possession for LAIRCM sustainers was also discussed. The USAF 
requested data rights but not data possession on LAIRCM. As a result, the Air Force does not 
own the data and then must go sole source to NGC for the data it never requested from the 
program start which drives up the cost. In addition, LAIRCM data provided to WR-ALC is not at 
a Level III which is what is required to perform depot maintenance. Early planning by the 
stakeholders could have alleviated many of these problems. 
3.9.4.5 Program Management 
As mentioned in 3.9.4.1 excessive turnover of SPO personnel can lead to a breakdown of 
communications with the customer and contractor and lead to program impacts. The LAIRCM 
program is now on a 5-yr IDIQ. Estimates are the latest SPO team lost about 1-yr of executing 
the program due to schooling up time and learning the ropes. In addition, FMS programs  
(e.g. with Germany) have jeopardized the program schedule. 
3.10 Summary/Conclusion 
The requirement for LAIRCM surfaced in 1998 (LAIRCM ORD AMC/ACC/AFSOC #314-
92 3 Aug 98). The Air Force identified a requirement to protect its large vulnerable aircraft from 
IR-guided missile threats. LAIRCM is the primary DoD system for protecting large aircraft from 
the widespread and growing threat of MANPADS, shoulder-fired and mobile launched surface-
to-air missiles. LAIRCM provides an effective solution to defeating IR threats which saves 
aircraft and, more importantly, lives. Major customers include AMC, ANG, AFRC, AFSOC,  
C-5, C-17, C-20, C-37, C-40, C-130 variants, the Navy, CV-22, SOCOM, and FMS. 
The LAIRCM program has been a spiral development with Phase I delivering a laser-based 
system developed by the UK in concert with USSOCOM that met AMC’s urgent need. Phase II 
resulted in an improved system that was highly effective in countering MANPADS. LAIRCM is 
a MANPADS/IR SAM solution, not universal IR missiles, which is a much larger spectrum.  
Well applied Modeling and Simulation demonstrated LAIRCM’s ability to counter IR 
threats. NGC was able to demonstrate the laser-based LAIRCM before the first Viper™ system 
was ever produced. NGC employed sound systems engineering in its spiral development of 
LAIRCM. They were able to design and fit their Viper™ laser-based system into the same hole 
in the aircraft older generation flash-lamp based system was housed. NGC also installed common 
LAIRCM units on different aircraft which allowed maintainers the ability to “scab” units from 
one aircraft for use on a higher priority aircraft, for example.  
Human Systems Integration of LAIRCM came about long after the C-17 had been designed 
and developed. As a result, the cockpit display for LAIRCM had to be installed out-of-view of 
the pilots. The LAIRCM system is autonomous. The C-17 pilots do receive an indication of its 
operation on small indicators under the glare shield; however, the cockpit indicator display is not 
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front-and-center since it came about long after the instrument panel had been designed. C-130 
pilots rely on an audible warning of missile launch. 
Excessive turnover of the Air Force Systems Program Office (SPO) personnel led to a 
breakdown of communications with the customers and contractors and led to impacts to program 
cost, schedule, and performance. The nuisance effect of the constant Air Force personnel 
turnover was dramatic in the eyes of the contractor. There was a gradual degradation of the 
relationship NGC had with the SPO. Because of the inefficiency in the SPO due to constant 
personnel turnover, NGC felt SOCOM funding for LAIRCM was jeopardized. 
LAIRCM is now operational on over 500 aircraft in the USAF, Navy, Army, FAA, and 
Foreign Air Forces. Current plans are to install it on over 900 AMC aircraft (by FY 2020). 
LAIRCM continues to defeat threats posed against AMC aircraft. Modernization efforts are 
ongoing to support reliability and maintainability improvements with lower ownership costs. The 
system will continue to be improved and provide protection to both materiel and lives. 
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Appendix A: A Framework for Systems Engineering Concept and Responsibility Domains 
 
This Friedman-Sage matrix is included as an exercise for the student. Following the explanation in Section 1.5 
of this Case Study develop 4-6 systems engineering learning principles from the case study and then insert them into 
the matrix based on whether they were a contractor responsibility, a government responsibility, or a shared 
responsibility between the government and the contractor. 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor Responsibility 2. Shared Responsibility 3. Government Responsibility 
A. Requirements 
Definition and 
Management 
   
B. Systems 
Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
   
C. System and 
Subsystem Detailed 
Design and 
Implementation 
   
D. Systems and 
Interface Integration 
   
E. Validation and 
Verification 
   
F. Deployment and 
Post Deployment 
   
G. Life Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment 
and Management 
   
I. System and Program 
Management 
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Appendix C: Acronyms 
ACA Associate Contractor Agreement 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACM Aircraft Characterization Module 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AESG Aeronautical Systems Group 
AESS Aeronautical Systems Squadron 
AESW Aeronautical Systems Wing 
AF Air Force 
AFAE Air Force Acquisition Executive 
AFCAA Air Force Cost Analysis Agency 
AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center 
AFI Air Force Instruction 
AFMC Air Force Materiel Command 
AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center 
AFPEO/AC Air Force Program Executive Officer for Aircraft 
AFRC Air Force Reserve Command  
AFROC Air Force Requirements Oversight Council 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 
AMC Air Mobility Command 
AMC/A5 Air Mobility Command Requirements Group 
ANG Air National Guard 
APB Acquisition Program Baseline 
ASAF (A) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
ASC Aeronautical Systems Center 
ASE Aircraft Survivability Equipment  
ATIRCM Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure 
BIT Built-in-Test 
CBSG  Combat Sustainment Group 
CBSS Combat Sustainment Squadron 
CCB Configuration Control Board 
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C-E LCMC Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command 
CFR Code of Federal Regulation 
CIU Control Indicator Unit 
CIUR Control Interface Unit Replacement 
C-MANPADS Counter Man Portable Air Defensive Systems  
CMNS Combat Mission Needs Statement 
CMWS Common Missile Warning System 
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
CPI Critical Program Information 
CPIF Cost-Plus Incentive Fee 
CR Cost Reimbursement 
CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
CTA Center Test Authority 
DAC Designated Acquisition Commander 
DRB Deficiency Review Board 
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 
DES Directed Energy Solutions 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIRCM Directional Infrared Countermeasures 
DMSMS Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortage 
DMS/OPR Diminished Manufacturing Source/Obsolete Parts Replacement 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoS Department of State 
DOT&E Director of Operational Test & Evaluation 
DT Developmental Testing 
DT&E Developmental Test & Evaluation 
DVT Design Verification Test 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
EOM Electro-optical Modules  
ESOH Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health 
EVMS Earned Value Management System  
EW Electronic Warfare 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
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FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FCA Functional Configuration Audit 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
FFP Firm Fixed Price 
FRACAS Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System  
FRP Full Rate Production 
FTS Fine Track Sensor 
FY Fiscal Year 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GFP Government Furnished Property 
GLTA GuardianTM Laser Tracker Assembly 
HAZMAT Hazardous Material 
HITL Hardware in-the-Loop 
HMMPP Hazardous Material Management Program Plan 
HoS Head of State 
HSI Human System Integration 
IBIT Initiated Built-in-Test  
IBO Industrial Base Office 
ICE Independent Cost Estimate 
ICS Interim Contractor Support 
ID/IQ Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
IMP Integrated Master Plan 
IMS Integrated Master Schedule 
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
IR Infrared 
IRCM Infrared Countermeasures 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ISP Intelligence Support Plan 
ITA Integrated Threat Assessment 
ITT Integrated Test Team 
IUID Item Unique Identification   
JRMET Joint Reliability Maintainability Evaluation Team 
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KPP Key Performance Parameter 
LAF LAIRCM Acquisition Follow-on  
LAIRCM Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCMP Life Cycle Management Plan 
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging  
LOA Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
LOD Letter of Determination 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
LSPR LAIRCM System Processor Replacement 
L/TA Laser Transmitter Assembly  
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
MAF  Mobility Air Forces 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MEON Multi-Role Electro-Optical End-To-End  
M-Sig Missile Signature 
MIR Medium Infrared 
MTBR Mean Time Between Removal 
MUDM Maintenance User Data Module 
MWS Missile Warning System 
MXW Maintenance Wing 
NAIC National Air Intelligence Center 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NexGen  Next Generation  
NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation 
NSN National Stock Number 
OA Operational Assessment 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OSS&E Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness 
OT Operational Testing 
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OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation 
PBL Performance Based Logistics 
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
PEO Program Executive Officer 
PESHE Programmatic Environment, Health Evaluation 
PM Program Manager 
PMD Program Management Document 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
POE Program Office Estimate 
PPP Program Protection Plan  
PSMOA Program Specific Memorandum of Agreement 
P/T Pointer/Tracker 
PTA Pointer Tracker Assembly 
PTO Participating Test Organization 
OFP Operational Flight Program 
QCL Quantum Cascade Lasers  
QE Quiet EyesTM 
R&D Research and Development 
RAM Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability  
RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
RF Radio Frequency 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RMP Risk Management Process 
SAF Secretary of the Air Force 
SBIR Small Business Innovative Research  
SCG Security Classification Guide 
SDD System Development & Demonstration 
SECAF Secretary of the Air Force 
SEP Systems Engineering Plan 
SERD Support Equipment Requirement Document 
SIL Software Integration Laboratory 
SLTA Small Laser Transmitter Assembly 
SOCOM Special Operations Command 
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SORAP Source of Repair Assignment Process 
SP System Processor 
SPO System Program Office 
SRU Shop Replaceable Unit 
SSEWG System Security Engineering Working Group 
SSM System Support Manager  
SSP Source Selection Plan  
STC Supplemental Type Certificate (FAA) 
SWEAP Secure Web-based Electronic Acquisition Program 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
T&M Time and Material 
TED Threat Environment Description 
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TO Technical Order 
TPWG Test Planning Working Group  
TSP Transition Support Plan 
TW Test Wing 
UDM User Data Module 
UID Unique Identification 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
USA United States Army 
USAF United States Air Force 
USD (AT&L) Office of Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics 
USG United States Government 
USN United States Navy 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UV Ultraviolet 
VDATS Versatile Depot Automated Test Stations  
WR-ALC Warner Robins Air Logistics Center 
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